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a b s t r a c t
Recent investigations of the acquisition of scalar implicature report that young children do
not reliably reject a sentence with a weak scalar term, e.g. ‘some of the books are red’, when
it is used as a description of a situation where a stronger statement is true, e.g. where all
the books are red. This is taken as evidence that children do not interpret the sentence with
the implicature that the stronger statement does not hold. We propose that (a) these tasks
cannot differentiate between actual implicature derivation and mere sensitivity to viola-
tions of informativeness; and that (b) children’s apparent failure is not due to lack of com-
petence (whether with informativeness or implicature) but due to their tolerance of
pragmatic violations. We report three studies with 5-to-6-year-old English-speaking chil-
dren and adults employing utterances involving scalar and non-scalar expressions. These
show that both age-groups are competent with informativeness, but also tolerant of prag-
matic infelicity. These ﬁndings have implications for the well-established literature on
whether children are aware of ambiguity in referential communication tasks.
 2011 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we demon-
strate that the ability to generate quantity implicatures re-
lies upon competence with informativeness, and that
previous investigations of the acquisition of implicature
confound these two abilities. Competence with informa-
tiveness is also necessary for detecting ambiguity in refer-
ential communication tasks. It is therefore not coincidental
that recent research on implicatures is converging with
well-established research on ambiguity detection with re-
spect to the age at which children reach adult-like compe-
tence. Secondly, we challenge the conclusion that children
younger than 7 years old lack adult-like competence in
these tasks. We show that 5-year-old children are in fact
aware of underinformativeness, but that they are also tol-
erant of pragmatic infelicity, and do not penalise it as
strictly as logical falsity. In the most widely-used experi-
mental paradigms, this pragmatic tolerance has led to the
misleading conclusion that children are not competent
with informativeness. In our ﬁrst study, we replicate the
major ﬁnding that children fail with informativeness when
a binary judgement task is used. In our second and third
studies, we show that young children and adults are sensi-
tive to but tolerant of violations of informativeness. We
also show that these ﬁndings are not speciﬁc to just one
type of linguistic expression.
In the next section we brieﬂy discuss quantity implicat-
ure, informativeness and ambiguity detection, and high-
light the common pragmatic competence that underlies
them. We then review research on the acquisition of infor-
mativeness and spell out the predictions of our novel ac-
count, before verifying these experimentally.
1.1. Quantity implicature and informativeness
A fundamental aspect of human communicative
competence is the ability to express and infer information
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and (2):(1) a. Mary: Did you dance with John and Bill?
b. Jane: I danced with John
c. Implicature: Jane did not dance with Bill(2) a. Mary: Did all your class fail the test?
b. Jane: Some of my class failed
c. Implicature: Not all Jane’s class failedGiven questions (1a) and (2a), Jane can be understood as
conveying the literal meaning of (1b) and (2b) as well as
(1c) and (2c) respectively, which are not part of what she
explicitly said. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims
(1975/1989) characterise how such information is commu-
nicated. Grice proposed that interlocutors assume each
other to be cooperative, and speciﬁcally informative, truth-
ful, concise and relevant. If what is explicitly said by the
speaker violates any of these assumptions, listeners may
infer additional information that would repair such a viola-
tion. These pragmatic inferences are known as implicatures.
Speciﬁcally, the implicature (1c) is derived because Jane
is assumed to obey the ﬁrst maxim of Quantity, which re-
quires her to be as informative as is required for the com-
municative purpose (Grice, 1975/1989; see also Horn,
1972, 1984; Levinson, 1983; i.a.). The inference would be
derived in (at least) two steps. The ﬁrst step involves deter-
mining whether the speaker could have made a more
informative statement: in this case, Jane could have said
that she danced with John and Bill. Given (1a), this extra
information would be relevant. The second step involves
the negation of the more informative statement that was
identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step. This reasoning is valid because,
if Jane is adhering to the ﬁrst maxim of Quantity, she is not
being underinformative. Therefore, the most likely reason
why she did not make the more informative statement is
that it is not true. In this way she communicates the nega-
tion of the stronger statement implicitly through a quantity
implicature (see Geurts (2010), for a detailed discussion).
Similarly, the ﬁrst step in the derivation of (2c) involves
determining that there is a statement (‘all of my class
failed’) that would have been relevant and more informa-
tive than (2b). In the second step, the hearer reasons that
Jane did not make the more informative statement because
it does not hold, which is the inference in (2c). Because (2b)
is part of a scale of informativeness formed by propositions
with the quantiﬁers ‘some’, ‘many’, ‘most’, ‘all’, it may be
considered a special case of quantity implicature, namely
a scalar implicature.
Investigations of the acquisition of scalar implicature
have reported that children younger than 7 years of age
cannot derive these implicatures at adult-like levels, or at
levels comparable to their competence with explicit mean-
ing (see Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Feeney, Scrafton,
Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia,
submitted for publication; Guasti et al., 2005; Huang &
Snedeker, 2009a; Hurewitz, Papafragou, Gleitman, &
Gelman, 2006; Katsos, 2009; Katsos, Andrés Roqueta,
Estevan, & Cummins, 2010; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou &Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Pouscou-
lous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007; among others. See
Noveck & Reboul, 2009, for an overview).
This is consistent with work on whether children detect
ambiguity in referential communication tasks. When chil-
dren aged 5–6 are given instructions that do not uniquely
disambiguate the target referent (e.g. when they are pre-
sented with a picture of two men with hats, and told to
point to the man with the hat), they still select a referent,
and they do not tell the experimenter that s/he did not give
them enough information (Ackerman, 1981; Beal & Flavell,
1982; Robinson & Robinson, 1982; Robinson & Whittaker,
1985; among many others; see Plumert, 1996, and Beck,
Robinson, & Freeth, 2008, for recent developments and
an overview of previous work). Although the research on
ambiguity detection has not interacted with that on impli-
cature, both converge on the ﬁnding that 5-to-6-year-old
children fail to employ the ﬁrst maxim of Quantity in an
adult-like way.
Nevertheless, much younger children succeed with
many of the preconditions of pragmatic inferencing, such
as attributing and monitoring intentions, tracking their
interlocutor’s epistemic state, and counterfactual reason-
ing (see Clark, 2003; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Tomasello,
1992; among others). Therefore, the failure of school-age
children with implicatures and ambiguity detection is
puzzling.
In this paper we investigate why 5-to-6-year-old chil-
dren fail with informativeness. Our approach has a theoret-
ical and an experimental component. The theoretical part
discusses three major points. First, we argue that scalar
and non-scalar quantity implicatures are both derived by
the same inferential process, and therefore we would not
expect one type of implicature to be privileged over the
other in acquisition. Second, we show that sensitivity to
informativeness is a precondition for implicature deriva-
tion, and therefore that informativeness must be consid-
ered when interpreting studies that purport to document
competence with implicatures (or a lack thereof). Third,
we observe that sensitivity to informativeness and the der-
ivation of quantity implicatures are context-dependent
and conversational in nature. We conclude that research-
ers testing pragmatic competence should be aware that
participants may be tolerant towards pragmatic infelicity
and not penalise it to the same extent as logical contradic-
tion, and should design test materials accordingly.
In the experimental part of the paper, we demonstrate
that 5- to 6-year-old English-speaking children are per-
fectly competent with informativeness, both with scalar
and non-scalar expressions. However, they are also toler-
ant of pragmatic violations. This previously unacknowl-
edged tendency towards pragmatic tolerance has
signiﬁcantly masked children’s actual competence with
the ﬁrst maxim of Quantity in a variety of tasks, including
the referential communication tasks.
In the following sections we discuss why the type of
implicature may be important in the study of acquisition
(Section 2.1), the distinction between sensitivity to infor-
mativeness and implicature generation (Section 2.2), and
why participants may tolerate pragmatic infelicity
(Section 2.3).
1 Note that the justiﬁcations given by participants when rejecting
underinformative utterances are straightforwardly consistent with the
participants merely being sensitive to underinformativeness (see the
justiﬁcations quoted in Guasti et al., 2005; Katsos, 2009; Papafragou &
Tantalou, 2004; among others). There is no evidence that responses are
based on actual implicatures: to the best of our knowledge, no studies
report participants objecting on the grounds that ‘some’ means ‘some but
not all’.
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With the exceptions of Barner et al. (2011), Papafragou
and Tantalou (2004) and Katsos (2009), existing studies on
the acquisition of implicature have exclusively considered
the scalar type. However, whether these ﬁndings should
generalise to non-scalar implicatures is a theoretically con-
tested issue. The main difference between cases such as
non-scalar (1) and scalar (2) is that, in the former case,
the more informative alternative proposition can only be
established with reference to context. By contrast, infor-
mational scales for expressions such as quantiﬁers (<some,
all>), sentential connectives (<or, and>) and modals
(<might, must>) are available without reference to the spe-
ciﬁc context. Although Grice and subsequent theorists
acknowledged this difference, both types of implicature
satisfy the criteria to be considered as pragmatic aspects
of meaning (see Geurts, 2010; Horn, 1984; Levinson,
1983; Sadock, 1978; for empirical evidence see Breheny,
Katsos, and Williams (2006), Katsos (2008), Katsos,
Breheny, and Williams (2005), and references therein).
However, recent accounts of implicature differ as to
whether these two types of implicature can be treated sim-
ilarly. Default accounts of implicature (e.g. Chierchia, 2004;
Levinson, 2000) posit that implicatures arising from
context-independent scales are linguistically and psycho-
linguistically privileged compared to fully context-depen-
dent implicatures. Consequently, children are predicted
to acquire the ability to process scalar implicatures earlier
than non-scalar implicatures. For instance, Guasti et al.
(2005) proposes that the scale <some, all> may form part
of the extended lexical entry for ‘some’, thus facilitating
the scalar implicature. By contrast, unitary accounts of
pragmatic inferencing (Carston, 1998; Geurts, 2010;
Hirschberg, 1991; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; i.a.)
collapse the distinction between scalar and non-scalar
implicatures on the grounds that both rely on contextu-
ally-speciﬁed expectations of informativeness. Preliminary
empirical evidence that adjudicates between these two
classes of account is available (Papafragou & Tantalou,
2004; see Katsos (2009) for a critical discussion of the
methodology), but the issue still remains open to compre-
hensive experimental investigation.
1.3. Sensitivity to informativeness vs. implicature derivation
The most frequently used paradigm for investigating
the acquisition of implicature is the binary judgment task
(Barner et al., 2011; Feeney et al., 2004; Foppolo et al., sub-
mitted for publication; Guasti et al., 2005; Katsos, 2009;
Katsos et al., 2010; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino,
2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Pouscoulous et al.,
2007; among others. Many of these tasks are inspired by
the Truth Value Judgment Task by Crain & Thornton,
1998). In this task, participants are asked to provide a bin-
ary judgment (typically ‘true’/‘false’ or ‘right’/‘wrong’) in
cases where a situation is described using a less-than-
optimally-informative statement. An example is the sce-
nario in (3), where child participants are told that they
are helping ‘Mr. Caveman’, a ﬁctional animated character,
to learn English.(3) Scenario: The experimenter, Mr. Caveman, and
the participant watch a short animation in which
a mouse, who likes vegetables, picks up all of the
carrots and none of the pumpkins in the displaya. Experimenter to Mr. Caveman: What did the
mouse pick up?b. Mr. Caveman: The mouse picked up some of the
carrotsc. Experimenter to participant: Is that right?Mr. Caveman’s answer in (3b) is grammatically ﬂaw-
less and logically true, because indeed some of the carrots
have been picked up. It is assumed that if participants
were to base their response only on what is explicitly said,
they should accept Mr. Caveman’s answer. However, if
participants interpret Mr. Caveman’s answer with a scalar
implicature, to the effect that the mouse did not pick up
all of the carrots, they should reject it. Existing studies re-
port that children under 7 years old do not consistently
reject underinformative statements of this type, and
hence conclude that children do not derive scalar impli-
catures at adult-like rates. By contrast, children perform
at or near adult-like rates with the logical meaning of
‘some’ (e.g. children know that ‘the mouse picked up some
of the carrots’ requires that the mouse picked up two or
more of the carrots). They also perform at a high level
with the meaning of ‘all’ and other quantiﬁers. Conse-
quently, there is agreement that children are not chal-
lenged with quantiﬁer meaning in general, but with
scalar implicature speciﬁcally.
To the best of our knowledge, studies using the binary
judgment task all assume that the participants who reject
utterances with a weak scalar term in situations where a
strong term is applicable do so because they have derived
an implicature. However, as noted by Katsos (2009), this
collapses the ﬁrst and the ﬁnal step of implicature deriva-
tion into a single stage. Katsos (2009) argues that, in these
paradigms, the ﬁrst stage of implicature derivation (aware-
ness that a more informative statement could have been
made) sufﬁces to permit the rejection of underinformative
utterances. That is, participants could object to underinfor-
mative utterances if they recognise that the speaker has gi-
ven less information than he could, without even
considering the implicature arising from the utterance. In
the case of (3), participants do not need to calculate the
implicature ‘the mouse did not pick up all of the carrots’.
Merely recognising that Mr. Caveman only said ‘some of
the carrots’ when they witnessed the mouse picking up
all of the carrots is sufﬁcient reason to object to the utter-
ance1. This applies to non-scalar implicatures as well, as in
scenario (4).
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the participant watch a short animation in which
a dog, who is an artist, paints the triangle and the
heart in the display but does not paint the star or
the square in the displaya. Experimenter to Mr. Caveman: What did the dog
paint?b. Mr. Caveman: The dog painted the triangle
c. Experimenter to participant: Is that right?Again, simply recognising that Mr. Caveman only said
‘the triangle’, having witnessed the dog painting the trian-
gle and the heart, is sufﬁcient reason to object to the utter-
ance, without further requiring the computation of the
implicature that the dog did not paint the heart. It is there-
fore not clear whether binary judgment tasks test partici-
pants’ sensitivity to informativeness or their actual
derivation of implicatures.
This observation is also potentially critical for other par-
adigms used to study implicature, including the Felicity
Judgment task (Reinhart, 2004; Foppolo et al., submitted
for publication; among others), sentence-to-picture
matching tasks (Hurewitz et al., 2006) and visual world
eye-tracking studies. To take an example of the latter,
Huang and Snedeker (2009a, 2009b) investigate whether
children aged 5½ and adults use a scalar implicature to se-
lect the appropriate referent from a display of four pic-
tures. In an example of their critical condition, two of the
pictures are of girls, one of whom has some of the socks
(there being other socks in the display), while the other
has all of the soccer balls (there being no other soccer balls
in the display). Participants are instructed to ‘point to the
girl with some of the socks’. The critical issue is whether
participants will ﬁxate on the target referent (the girl with
some of the socks) before the onset of ‘socks’, which is the
semantic disambiguation point. To succeed in this task, we
argue that participants do not need to draw an implicature,
but simply have to be sensitive to the fact that ‘the girl
with some of the. . .’ would be underinformative if it re-
ferred the girl with (all of) the soccer balls. As in the binary
judgment paradigm, participants will also succeed in the
task if they draw the implicature (‘some but not all of
the. . .’), but once again they do not need to do so.
Sensitivity to informativeness is a precondition for
implicature derivation in the Gricean approach and all its
major reformulations (e.g. Chierchia, 2004; Geurts, 2010;
Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; among oth-
ers). Our interim conclusion is that the literature so far has
relied upon paradigms that test the former without neces-
sarily also testing the latter.
1.4. Judging underinformative utterances: a case for
pragmatic tolerance
The third observation we wish to make is that prag-
matic infelicity in the widely used paradigms does not give
rise to the same kind of violations as logical falsity. As a re-
sult, the pragmatically appropriate response to underinfor-
mative utterances in these paradigms is not clear.First let us suppose that participants are resolving
judgement tasks by being sensitive to informativeness
(rather than deriving implicatures). Underinformative
utterances are strictly speaking true, but sub-optimal. They
could therefore be evaluated as better than false utterances
but worse than felicitous ones. Hence there may be no
single ‘correct’ response for all participants in binary
judgement tasks: those who focus on the utterances’ sub-
optimality may reject them, while those who focus on
the utterances’ truthfulness may accept them.
Now let us suppose instead that participants are actually
deriving implicatures. This implicated meaning is defeasible
or cancellable: in other words, it can be revised without giv-
ing rise to such strong contradictions as when aspects of ex-
plicit logical meaning are revised (see Horn, 1984;
Levinson, 1983; i.a.). This intuitive claim is supported
empirically (Katsos, 2007: 106ff; Cummins & Katsos,
2010, experiment 3). Participants were presented with
short discourses inwhich an utterancewith a scalar expres-
sion was followed by an utterance that contradicted either
an aspect of the logical meaning of the expression or its sca-
lar implicature. For example, ‘Some of John’s friends are lin-
guists’ was followed either by ‘In fact none of them are’
(logical contradiction) or ‘In fact all of them are’ (pragmatic
contradiction). Given a Likert scale, adult speakers of Eng-
lish rated the latter condition signiﬁcantly more coherent
than the former, but less coherent than felicitous controls.
These observations suggest that participants who ac-
cept underinformative utterances in binary judgment tasks
may do so for either of two radically different reasons. One
is that they truly lack some aspect of the necessary compe-
tence. The other is that they are fully sensitive to but also
tolerant of violations of informativeness. However, both
conditions lead to the same behavioural response, namely
acceptance of the underinformative utterance. Therefore, it
is not possible to disentangle these possibilities using the
experimental paradigms discussed so far.
Taking these observations into account, we argue that
the interpretation of existing experimental data should
be revised, as follows. For paradigms such as the visual
world-eye-tracking employed by Huang and Snedeker
(2009a, 2009b), correct performance indicates sensitivity
to underinformativeness, and perhaps also the ability to
derive implicatures. We cannot rule out a scenario in
which adults derive full implicatures but children are
merely sensitive to informativeness (or, less likely, the re-
verse). Nor can we rule out differences of this type within
age groups.
For binary judgment tasks such as those employed by
Noveck (2001), Papafragou and Musolino (2003), Guasti
et al. (2005), Barner et al. (2011) and many others, it is
again unclear whether the critical competence is sensitiv-
ity to informativeness or the ability to derive implicatures.
Moreover, the failure to reject underinformative utterances
may not indicate a lack of this critical competence, but in-
stead indicate tolerance of pragmatic violations. Again,
groups may differ in the reasons for their judgement: it
is possible that children’s acceptance of underinformative
utterances arises from a lack of competence, while adults’
acceptances are grounded in full pragmatic competence
coupled with tolerance of pragmatic infelicity.
N. Katsos, D.V.M. Bishop / Cognition 120 (2011) 67–81 71Motivated by the observations in these three subsec-
tions, we report three studies which aim to clarify the rel-
evant issues. We investigate (a) whether young children’s
acceptance of underinformative utterances in binary judg-
ment tasks is due to tolerance of pragmatic violations
rather than lack of pragmatic competence; and (b) whether
there is a signiﬁcant difference between their behaviour
with scalar and non-scalar expressions.
To do so, we ﬁrst administer a binary judgment task
(experiment 1), which reproduces the ﬁnding that 5- to
6-year-old children do not reject underinformative utter-
ances at the rates that they reject logically false ones, or
at the same rates as adults. In experiment 2 we administer
the same task, but instead of a binary scale (‘right’ or
‘wrong’) we give participants a ternary scale (awarding
the ﬁctional character ‘a small’, ‘a big’, or ‘a huge straw-
berry’). This experiment is the crucial test of our hypothe-
sis on pragmatic tolerance. If children are not sensitive to
informativeness, they should give the highest reward for
true but underinformative utterances, just as if they were
optimal (true and informative). However, under our
hypothesis, children are sensitive to underinformativeness
but also tolerant of this kind of infelicity. In this case, they
should give the middle reward for underinformativeness
and reserve the lowest reward for false utterances. In
experiment 3, we further test pragmatic tolerance by run-
ning a sentence-to-picture matching study with the same
materials as experiments 1 and 2.
In interpreting these studies, we are conservative about
whether participants are basing their responses on sensi-
tivity to informativeness or actual derivation of a quantity
implicature. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the former holds,
as it is a necessary precondition for the latter. In the Gen-
eral Discussion we explore ways to disentangle these is-
sues. To permit between-task comparisons we use the
same experimental stimuli throughout.2. Experiment 1: underinformative utterances in a
binary judgment task
This experiment aimed to replicate the typical ﬁnding
from binary judgment tasks with 5- to 6-year-old children,
in which children predominantly accept underinformative
utterances.2.1. Method
A computer-based utterance-judgment task was con-
structed by combining clip art pictures and animations
with pre-recorded utterances on Microsoft Power Point
software. The task was administered by a single experi-
menter. At the beginning of the experiment, participants
are introduced to a ﬁctional character, Mr. Caveman, who
walks to the middle of the computer screen and introduces
himself (by means of utterances pre-recorded by a male
non-native but proﬁcient speaker of English) and asks par-
ticipants to help him learn English. The experimenter elab-
orates that Mr. Caveman knows quite a lot of English, but
he would like to learn to speak English perfectly, like the
participant does. The experimenter further explains thatthey will see some stories and that the experimenter will
be narrating what is going on in each story. At the end of
each story, the experimenter will ask a question and Mr.
Caveman will try to answer it. Participants were told that
if Mr. Caveman’s answer is right, they should tell Mr. Cave-
man ‘‘that’s right’’. If Mr. Caveman’s answer is wrong, they
should tell Mr. Caveman ‘‘that’s wrong’’, and help him by
explaining why it was wrong.
In subsequent displays Mr. Caveman is positioned at the
bottom of the screen. Each story starts with a screen that is
empty except for Mr. Caveman, who asks for the story to
begin. Using animations the experimenter introduces the
protagonist of each story, the activity that he/she generally
likes doing, and the speciﬁc options for action available in
this story. The protagonist of the story performs some
course of action, which is seen in real time (using Microsoft
Power Point animation options). For example, in the story
where the mouse picks up all of the carrots but none of the
pumpkins, there are two piles of vegetables displayed on
the left side of the screen, one of ﬁve pumpkins and one
of ﬁve carrots. The mouse moves from the right side of
the screen to the pile of carrots and carries each of them
back to its starting position, one by one. Each time the
mouse comes back with a carrot the experimenter com-
ments ‘Look, he picked up a carrot’. For each story, when
the protagonist completes his/her course of action, the
experimenter comments ‘and now s/he is very happy’,
and then asks Mr. Caveman a question.
2.2. Materials
There were 24 items, 12 of which were critical items,
testing the ability to reject underinformative utterances.
Half of these were for the scalar expression ‘some’, and half
for non-scalar expressions, such as the single noun phrase
in (4). All the items were answers to an object what-
question such as ‘So, what did the mouse pick up?’ or ‘So,
what did the dog paint?’ For each of these items Mr.
Caveman gives a logically true but pragmatically underin-
formative response (e.g. ‘The mouse picked up some of the
carrots’, ‘The dog painted the triangle’).
There were also 12 stories (six for scalar and six for non-
scalar expressions) of similar structure to the critical items.
Half of these stories tested whether participants could re-
ject logically false utterances. For example, after witness-
ing a scenario where a goat jumps over three out of the
ﬁve fences displayed and over none of the bushes dis-
played, the experimenter asks ‘So, what did the goat jump
over?’ and Mr. Caveman responds ‘The goat jumped over
some of the bushes’. The remaining stories tested whether
participants could accept optimal utterances (those which
are both logically true and pragmatically informative). For
example, after witnessing a scenario where the turtle
played with three out of the ﬁve balls displayed but with
none of the trucks displayed, the experimenter asks ‘So,
what did the turtle play with?’ and Mr. Caveman responds
‘The turtle played with some of the balls’. Six of the stories
testing logical truth and falsity made mention of the weak-
er term of the scale (‘some’ or single noun phrases) and six
mentioned the stronger term of the scale (‘all’ or conjoined
noun phrases). See Appendix A for the list of stories and
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scalar and non-scalar item.
2.3. Procedure
The task took between 15 and 25 min to administer and
it was part of an experimental session that lasted around
30 min for adult participants and 45 min for children. The
session also involved two selection measures for the chil-
dren, a non-verbal IQ test (Raven’s Coloured Matrices;
Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) and a sentence-repetition
task from the NEPSY battery (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp,
1999). In this and all subsequent experiments reported in
this paper, any child falling below 1.25 standard deviations
from the age-appropriate mean for the non-verbal IQ test
and/or the sentence-repetition task was removed from
the sample and replaced. The experiments took place in a
relatively quiet room in the children’s school, or at the
university for adults.
2.4. Participants
The participants were 20 5- to 6-year-old English-
speaking children (mean age 5;6, range 5;1–6;2) recruited
from primary schools in Cambridge, UK, and 20 adults, stu-
dents of the University of Cambridge (mean age 23;8,
range 20;1–30;3). Two children did not meet the criteria
for the selection tasks and were replaced.
2.4.1. Scoring the responses
All the child responses were straightforward ‘yes’, ‘no’,
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ responses, and were scored as correct or
incorrect for the critical and control items. All the adult re-
sponses to the logically false and the optimal conditions
were also ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. For the underinfor-
mative utterances, a range of responses was elicited from
the adults, including revisions of the original utterances
and meta-linguistic comments. In the main analysis we
classiﬁed all adult responses that were a straightforward
‘yes’ or ‘right’ as incorrect, on the grounds that the partic-
ipant did not object to the infelicity. We classiﬁed all other
responses as correct, regardless of whether the response
came as a straightforward rejection, or a more indirect
objection, as in any case participants had detected that
Mr. Caveman’s utterance was not a perfectly felicitous an-
swer to the question. We also performed a second analysis
where we took into account how many of the informative
responses came in the form of a straightforward rejection
or in an indirect objection.
When participants gave a response other than a
straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘right’ and did not spontaneously
explain why they gave this response, the experimenter
prompted them for an explanation. All participants were
able to answer informatively with reference to the appro-
priate scale e.g. ‘because [the mouse] picked up all the car-
rots’, ‘because [Mr. Caveman] said some’. One participant
rejected one instance of an item with ‘some’ on the
grounds that Mr. Caveman should have used a numeral
(he should have said ‘. . .three of the fences’ rather than
‘. . .some of the fences’). This response was scored as incor-
rect. The experimenter then explained that Mr. Cavemandoes not use number words because he already knows
them and he wants to learn other ways of saying things,
using words like ‘some’ and ‘all’. After this explanation,
the participant did not object again to the use of a quanti-
ﬁer instead of a numeral.
2.5. Results: main analysis
Both children and adults were highly competent in the
control conditions, rejecting logically false utterances and
accepting optimal (logically true and informative) ones at
rates over 95%. The only two erroneous responses were
elicited from one child rejecting one instance of a scalar
expression in an optimal condition (as mentioned above),
and another child rejecting one instance of a non-scalar
expression in an optimal condition. Turning to responses
to the critical underinformative utterances, all the adult re-
sponses were rejections or objections. However, the chil-
dren rejected underinformative utterances at rates of
only 29% (26% and 31% for scalar and non-scalar expres-
sions respectively).
Two Mann–Whitney U-tests reveal that the adults per-
formed higher than the children in the underinformative
conditions for scalar and non-scalar expressions (both
U > 4.95, p < .001, effect size r for non-parametric tests
>.78;where>.10maybe considereda small effect, >.30med-
iumand>.50 large).Within the child group, further pairwise
comparisons by Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests reveal that
childrenperformed reliably higher in both the logically false
and the optimal conditions compared to the underinforma-
tive condition, both for scalars and non-scalars (both
W > 3.6, p < .001, r > .8, for false vs. underinformative; both
W > 3.6, p < .001, r > .8 for optimal vs. underinformative
respectively).Moreover, children’s performance did not sig-
niﬁcantly differ between scalar and non-scalar expressions
in the underinformative condition (W = .84, p > .1).
Moreover, the rates of rejection of underinformative
utterances were reliably above what one would expect if
there was no sensitivity to informativeness at all (=no
rejections of underinformativeness: One-sample t-test,
both t(19) > 3.1, p < .005, effect size Cohen’s d for paramet-
ric tests > .75). Let us also consider participant distribution
to examine whether children are uniform in occasionally
rejecting underinformative utterances, or whether they
cluster in sub-groups. We classiﬁed children as consis-
tently underinformative (rejecting 0–1 out of six underin-
formative utterances) or inconsistent (rejecting 2–4 out
of six utterances) or consistently informative (rejecting
5–6 out of six utterances). This classiﬁcation was done sep-
arately for scalar and non-scalars on the grounds that the
type of expression might make a difference: for scalar
expressions, 13 children were consistently underinforma-
tive, 3 were inconsistent, and 4 were consistently informa-
tive. For non-scalar expressions, the distribution was 12, 2
and 6 respectively. This classiﬁcation reveals that the
majority (17 and 18 out of 20 children for scalars and
non-scalars respectively) were consistent in their behav-
iour (either informative or underinformative). This ﬁnding
is in line with the participant distributions reported by
Guasti et al. (2005) for children and Bott and Noveck
(2004) for adults for the scalar expressions. It further
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pect of pragmatic competence important to performing
this task. Not only was there a difference at the group level
between the rejection of underinformative and false utter-
ances, but at the individual level the majority of children
(13 out of 20 for scalars and 12 out of 20 for non-scalars)
consistently accepted underinformative utterances.2.6. Results: analysis of indirect responses
As mentioned, many adult responses did not consist of a
straightforward acceptance or rejection, but were more
indirect, phrased as revisions or meta-linguistic remarks.
Indirect responses were obtained in the underinformative
condition only, at rates of 12% and 33% for scalars and
non-scalars respectively (as a proportion of all non-
acceptances). More than 90% of these indirect responses
were revisions starting with ‘yes’, ‘true’ or ‘right’, followed
by the informative description (either with the use of ‘but’
or ‘and’ or without any conjunction). For instance, one
adult participant said ‘‘yes, he picked up all of them’’, and
‘‘yes, but he also painted the heart’’. The remaining indirect
responses did not commit with regard to the correct binary
value of the utterance (‘right’ or ‘wrong’) but included
explicitly meta-linguistic remarks such as ‘‘half right, half
wrong’’, ‘‘I can’t really tell’’, ‘‘I don’t know’’.
If the indirect responses are scored as incorrect, then
adult performance in the underinformative conditions falls
to 88% for scalars and 67% for non-scalars. Adults are still
outperforming the children for both types of expression
(Mann–Whitney U: both U > 3.03, p < .001, r > .47), but
there is a main effect of expression, with the adults
performing higher with scalars than with non-scalars
(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, W = 2.03, p < .05, r = .45).
The presence of indirect responses in the underinforma-
tive but not in the logically false condition indicates that
adults do not consider violations of informativeness to be
as grave as violations of logical truth. However, no other
study using a similar paradigm (e.g. Guasti et al., 2005,
experiment 4; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003, both experi-
ments) reports any indirect responses from adults. Could
this mean that there is something erroneous with the task
that we designed? We think this unlikely on two grounds.
First, adults in the studies by Guasti and Foppolo were not
given the opportunity to respond orally to the experi-
menter, but were given the binary choice ‘yes’/‘no’ or
‘right’/‘wrong’ on paper (personal communication). This
precludes participants from making the kind of comments
that we elicited. Second, excluding indirect responses, we
are left with a rate of 88% correct responses to underinfor-
mative utterances with scalar expressions, comparable to
the 83% reported by Guasti et al. (2005, experiment 4)
and the 93% reported by Papafragou and Musolino (2003,
experiment 1)2. This dispels any concerns that our task elic-
ited fewer categorical rejections from the adults than other
tried-and-tested paradigms. Instead, our task design has
elicited relevant additional data: even when adults do not2 These studies did not include non-scalar items, and hence we could not
compare acceptance rates for these items.categorically reject underinformative utterances, they are
not oblivious to pragmatic infelicity, and their responses to
underinformative utterances reﬂect this.
2.7. Discussion for experiment 1
Children performed signiﬁcantly betterwhen the correct
response depended exclusively on the logical meaning of
scalar and non-scalar expressions than when it also de-
pended on informativeness. In the latter case, but not the
former, they also performed worse than the adults. This is
exactly the picture documented in previous studies which
has been interpreted as evidence that children lack some as-
pect of pragmatic competence. However, we propose an
alternative explanation for children’s acceptance of under-
informative utterances, namely that children are tolerant
of pragmatic infelicity in binary judgment tasks. To test this
claim directly, in the following experiment we give partici-
pants a ternary judgment task. If childrenarenot sensitive to
violations of informativeness, they should assign the same
rating to underinformative and optimal utterances. How-
ever, if children are sensitive to informativeness and also
tolerant of violations of informativeness they should consis-
tently choose the middle value for underinformative utter-
ances, reserving the highest and lowest value for optimal
(true and informative) and false utterances respectively.3. Experiment 2: underinformative utterances in a
ternary judgment task
3.1. Method
Exactly the same items and scenarios were used as in
experiment 1. However, instead of judging whether Mr.
Caveman’s response was right or wrong, participants were
asked to reward his response using a 3-point scale consist-
ing of different-sized strawberries. These strawberries are
introduced as Mr. Caveman’s ‘favourite food’, and are de-
picted visually in a horizontal line on printed paper, with
the smallest on the left and the biggest on the right, each
strawberry being twice the size of the previous one. Each
point in the scale was explicitly introduced with its label,
‘the small strawberry’, ‘the big strawberry’ and ‘the huge
strawberry’. Previous studies in our lab (Katsos & Smith,
2010) using an earlier version of this task revealed that
children of this age can give judgements using 5-point Lik-
ert-scales, so we did not administer training or special
instructions on how to use this 3-point scale.
3.2. Participants
The participantswere 18 5- to 6-year-old children (mean
age 5;8, range 5;3–6;3) attending a primary school in Cam-
bridge, UK and 10 adults (mean age 22;1, range 19;9–25;1).
All child participants passed the selection measures.
3.3. Results and discussion for experiment 2
The three responses, ‘small’, ‘big’ and ‘huge strawberry’
are coded as response 1, 2 and 3. The adults invariably
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informative and false utterances respectively. The results
from the child group are presented in Table 1.
A series of between-group comparisons using Mann–
Whitney U tests for each cell reveal that children did not
perform signiﬁcantly different than adults in any condition
(all U < 2.1, p > .05).
Within the child group, there were signiﬁcant differ-
ences in the responses to every type of utterance (optimal,
underinformative, false) both for both scalar and non-sca-
lar expressions (all six Friedman’s ANOVA v2(2) > 20.45,
p < .001). The preferred responses in the false, underinfor-
mative and optimal conditions were 1, 2 and 3 respectively
for both expressions (all 12 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests
W > 3.1, p < .001, r > .73). There was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the preferred responses for scalar and non-
scalar expressions given the same utterance type (all three
W < 1.3, p > .1). Critically, 2-responses were more frequent
in the underinformative than in the false condition, but
less frequent than in the optimal condition; 3-responses
were more frequent in the optimal than in the other two
conditions; and 1-responses were more frequent in the
false than in the other two conditions (all W > 3.3;
p < .001, r > .77). Thus, at the group level, children were
sensitive to informativeness (rating it lower than optimal)
but also tolerant (rating it higher than false).
Furthermore, an analysis of individual performance re-
veals that 16 out of 18 children consistently gave the mid-
dle reward to the underinformative utterances (at least 5
out of 6 cases for each expression), with the remaining
two children giving underinformative utterances the low-
est reward in at least four cases for each expression. More-
over, the children consistently awarded the top reward to
the optimal condition and consistently gave the lowest re-
ward to the false condition for each expression (with the
exception of one child who did not consistently award the
top reward to the optimal condition for scalar expressions).
Thus, given a ternary judgment task, each and every
individual child participant revealed consistent sensitivity
to underinformativeness (lower reward than optimal)
and 16 out of 18 also revealed tolerance (higher reward
than false). Every adult participant demonstrated both sen-
sitivity to informativeness and tolerance of pragmatic
infelicity.
This has implications for the interpretation of experi-
ment 1, where the majority of children consistentlyTable 1
Proportion of type of response in experiment 2.
Type of utterance Type of response Scalar Non-
scalar
Total
Optimal 3 – ‘huge’ 85 100 92.5
2 – ‘big’ 0 0 0
1 – ‘small’ 15 0 7.5
Underinformative 3 – ‘huge’ 0 6 3
2 – ‘big’ 89 85 87
1 – ‘small’ 11 9 10
False 3 – ‘huge’ 5 0 2.5
2 – ‘big’ 0 0 0
1 – ‘small’ 95 100 97.5accepted underinformative utterances (13/20 and 12/20
children for scalars and non-scalars respectively). We pro-
pose that this group of participants were in fact detecting
the violation of informativeness but did not consider it
grave enough to warrant the outright rejection of the
utterance.
Is it possible that the difference in children’s perfor-
mance across the two experiments is due to the tasks
requiring different types of competence: for example, that
experiment 1 requires the derivation of quantity implicat-
ures but experiment 2 only requires sensitivity to informa-
tiveness? We cannot see any motivation for postulating
this. The experiments do not differ in terms of visual or
procedural complexity, and use exactly the same linguistic
stimuli, visual animations and overall scenario. Moreover,
the experiments do not differ in terms of the meta-linguis-
tic demands of the task, as they both require participants
to pass judgment on utterances. The only apparent differ-
ence is the use of a ternary scale in experiment 2, which
enables participants to give a response that is more lenient
than a downright rejection but stricter than a thorough
endorsement of the utterance.
If our claims are well-founded, it should follow that
children’s pragmatic competence is best investigated using
paradigms in which pragmatic tolerance cannot cloud the
interpretation of the participants’ performance. To test this
supposition, we now turn to the sentence-to-picture
matching paradigm, where participants are visually pre-
sented with four outcomes of a scenario, and they are
asked to select the picture that matches their interpreta-
tion of the utterances used in experiments 1 and 2.4. Experiment 3: sentence-to-picture-matching
paradigm
4.1. Method
The computer-based judgement task used in experi-
ments 1 and 2 was modiﬁed as follows. The experimenter
explains that participants will see some stories and that
Mr. Caveman will narrate what is going on in the story.
After being introduced to each story, the participant will
be presented with four pictures on the screen, and Mr.
Caveman will say what eventually happened in the story
that he has in his mind. The participant should then point
to the picture that matches Mr. Caveman’s story.
The trials begin as in experiments 1 and 2. After the ini-
tial screen display showing the protagonist and the objects
that may be affected, participants are shown a second
screen divided into four (see Appendix C for a sample vi-
sual display). Mr. Caveman then says ‘In my story. . .’ and
then continues his utterance with the pre-recorded utter-
ances used in experiments 1 and 2. Participants are then
asked to point to the picture that matches Mr. Caveman’s
story.
The pictures differed in the type of objects that were de-
picted as affected by the protagonist’s actions (e.g. carrots,
pumpkins; heart, triangle) and in their quantity (some or
all, either or both). For example, in a critical trial for scalar
‘some’, participants were presented with four pictures,
Table 2
Proportion of correct picture-selection in experiment 3, standard deviation
in brackets.




Children .83 (.16) .86 (.15) .91 (.21) .89 (.21)
3 Note that these ﬁndings are not inconsistent with the visual-world eye-
tracking study by Huang and Snedeker (2009a) where children did not
ﬁxate on the picture consistent with the informative interpretation of the
scalar term before the onset of the disambiguating noun. Their results
signify that children exhibit a delay rather than a categorical failure to use
informativeness, and hence they are consistent with the fact that children
perform very well in our study, where children have as much time as they
need.
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up three out of ﬁve carrots, or three out of ﬁve pumpkins,
or ﬁve out of ﬁve carrots, or ﬁve out of ﬁve pumpkins. They
then heard ‘In my story, the mouse picked up some of the
carrots’. In a critical trial for non-scalar expressions, partic-
ipants were presented with four pictures, corresponding to
the situations in which the dog painted only the triangle,
only the heart, the heart and the triangle or the star and
the triangle.
4.2. Materials
The 24 items used in experiments 1 and 2 were used,
modiﬁed as described above. The position of the four pic-
tures on the screen was pseudo-randomised. The items
were presented to participants in either one of two pseu-
do-randomised orders.
4.3. Procedure
The task took between 15 and 20 min to administer and
was part of an experimental session that lasted around
40 min for adult participants and 30 min for children. The
session also involved the two verbal and non-verbal IQ
selection measures for children. The experiments took
place in a relatively quiet room in the children’s school,
or at the university for adults.
4.4. Participants
The participants were 15 5-year-old English-speaking
children (mean age 5;7; range 5;1–6;1), recruited from pri-
mary schools in Cambridge, UK, as well as 10 adults, stu-
dents of various subjects at the University of Cambridge
(mean age 23;9; range 19;9–26;3). One child was removed
and replaced in the sample on the grounds of low perfor-
mance in the selection measures.
4.5. Results and discussion for experiment 3
Adults performed at ceiling with only one error in a
non-scalar condition. The children’s performance was as
presented in Table 2.
Between-group comparisons (Mann–Whitney U) re-
vealed that children did not perform signiﬁcantly differ-
ently than adults in any condition (all U < 2.5, p > .05).
Focusing on the children, a Friedman’s ANOVA reveals no
signiﬁcant pairwise differences between conditions
(v2(3) = .84, p > .1). This suggests that any difﬁculty chil-
dren had was general to all conditions of the task, rather
than speciﬁc to the conditions contrasting on informative-
ness. We investigated this further by analysing the chil-
dren’s erroneous responses for the critical conditions
(‘some’ and single noun phrase). The 17% of erroneous re-
sponses for ‘some’ were distributed over all the other three
pictures on display (7% for the true but underinformative
picture, 7% for the picture with the correct quantity but
the incorrect object, and 3% for that with the incorrect
quantiﬁer and object). A similar pattern arose for the
non-scalars (9% errors distributed as 4%, 4%, and 1% forthe true but underinformative, false single object, and false
two objects respectively).
These ﬁndings further document that 5- to 6-year-old
children are sensitive to informativeness. Crucially, there
is no signiﬁcant difference between the children’s perfor-
mance when the selection is based exclusively on logical
meaning (for ‘all’ and conjoined noun phrases) and when
it is also reliant on informativeness (‘some’ and single noun
phrases)3.5. General discussion
In this paper we argued from Gricean principles that (a)
existing studies of the acquisition of implicature do not
unambiguously test whether participants are deriving an
implicature or simply exhibiting sensitivity to informative-
ness; (b) the acceptance of pragmatically infelicitous utter-
ances need not be attributed to lack of pragmatic
competence but may instead be due to tolerance of prag-
matic violations; and (c) there need not be a difference in
the acquisition of pragmatic competence with scalar and
non-scalar expressions. We presented three studies docu-
menting that 5- to 6-year-old English-speaking children
and adults are indeed both sensitive to and tolerant of vio-
lations of informativeness, and that this holds with scalar
and non-scalar expressions to the same extent. We argue
that this hitherto ignored tendency towards pragmatic tol-
erance is a potentially signiﬁcant factor in previous studies
that concluded that young children lack some important
aspect of pragmatic competence.
We do not deny that other factors proposed in the liter-
ature also inﬂuence whether participants reject underin-
formative utterances. Processing demands (Pouscoulous
et al., 2007), the presentation of a speciﬁc context against
which utterances are evaluated (Guasti et al., 2005) and
drawing attention to being informative (Papafragou &
Musolino, 2003) have been suggested as relevant consider-
ations for children (and the ﬁrst two for adults as well). In-
deed, we would suggest that some of these factors may
interact with pragmatic tolerance, e.g. when in a given task
it is particularly important to be informative. In this case
we might expect participants to treat pragmatic violations
as gravely as logical ones. This could include cases of expli-
cit intervention, in which children are trained to correct
underinformative descriptions (Papafragou & Musolino,
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cases where the question asked highlights a certain con-
trast, for example if Mr. Caveman were asked ‘Did the
mouse pick up all the carrots?’ instead of ‘What did the
mouse pick up?’
Turning to the relation between the sensitivity to infor-
mativeness and actual implicature derivation, we believe
that it is possible to disentangle whether participants are
competentwith one or the other, but not in judgement tasks
or sentence-to-picture-matching paradigms. Implicature
derivation can be tapped by paradigms that involve the par-
ticipant operatingona situation tomake itmatch their inter-
pretation of the critical utterances, rather than evaluating
whether the utterances are an adequate description of the
given situation. This holdsbecauseutterances canbe charac-
terised as underinformative only if they are presumed to be
describing an existing situation. We are currently exploring
this avenue based on the action-based paradigm developed
by Pouscoulous et al. (2007, experiment 3).
We do not claim that children’s mastery of informative-
ness and implicature derivation must develop in tandem.
As the former is a prerequisite for the latter, the latter is
likely to be psycholinguistically more demanding. There-
fore, while it is possible that at least some children in
our sample were resolving the tasks by actual implicature
derivation rather than mere sensitivity to informativeness,
the conservative approach is to interpret child behaviour
as driven by the latter. Moreover, children’s early compe-
tence in other areas where extensive pragmatic reasoning
may be involved, such as word learning, suggests that sen-
sitivity to informativeness may be developed at a younger
age (see Clark (2003), Plumert (1996) and references there-
in). In fact, according to the Gricean approach, we would
expect that competence with informativeness is available
as soon as the logical meaning of the expressions that form
a contrast is acquired.
Furthermore, it is also possible that differences between
scalar and non-scalar expressions may appear at some
developmental stage, even though these were not evident
in 5- to 6-year-old children. An intriguing ﬁnding was
the difference within the adult group in experiment 1,
where more straightforward categorical rejections were
elicited for underinformative utterances with scalars than
with non-scalars (88% vs. 67%). This could merit further
investigation, as it suggests that the difference between
expressions may arise later rather than earlier in develop-
ment, perhaps as the result of repeated exposure to con-
text-independent scales of informativeness.
5.1. Final remarks
In the remainder of the general discussion we address
two related topics. First, is there other evidence for prag-
matic tolerance in the literature and what are the implica-
tions for referential communication tasks? Second, why
are adults less tolerant than children?
With regard to the ﬁrst point, several other investiga-
tions have inadvertently reported data consistent with
pragmatic tolerance. For instance, Paterson, Liversedge,
White, Filik, and Jaz (2005) investigated how children
and adults understand sentences with ‘only’, such as ‘Thewoman is only walking a dog’, using sentences without
‘only’ as controls. In their binary judgement task (experi-
ment 1), for conditions where the woman was doing some-
thing else as well (e.g. walking a cat), participants rejected
the sentences with ‘only’ more than sentences without
‘only’, the difference increasing with age. Since the latter
implies that the woman is not doing anything else, while
the former explicitly states it, this difference is straightfor-
wardly in accordance with the pragmatic tolerance ac-
count, where tolerance is restricted to pragmatic rather
than semantic infelicity. Moreover, the youngest children
(aged 7–8) rejected underinformative utterances at rates
of 30% in the binary judgement task. However, in a picture
matching task (experiment 2) they selected the picture
matching the informative interpretation of the utterance
at rates about 85%. This stark contrast can be explained if
children in experiment 1 were sensitive to underinforma-
tiveness but refrained from categorically rejecting the sen-
tence when given a binary choice. These incidental ﬁndings
are in line with the pragmatic tolerance account, although
the authors do not discuss them in detail.
Further evidence for pragmatic tolerance comes from
referential communication investigations, in which chil-
dren are given underinformative instructions (e.g. when
told to point to the man with the hat in the context of
two men, each with a hat). An extensive developmental lit-
erature investigates whether children are aware of the
ambiguity of these instructions (Asher, 1979; Robinson &
Robinson, 1976, 1977, 1982; Bearison & Levey, 1977;
Ackerman, 1981; Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 1981; Beal
& Flavell, 1982; Robinson & Whittaker, 1985; Plumert,
1996; Beck et al., 2008; among many others). Two of the
major ﬁndings suggest that they are not. First, children do
select a referent in spite of the ambiguity, and, second, they
report that the instructions theywere givenwere adequate.
The latter is typically investigated by asking the child to tell
the experimenter if s/he gave them enough information or
not. For example, Robinson and Robinson (1982, experi-
ment 1) report that when asked ‘‘Have I told/shown you en-
ough about my card for you to get it right?’’ (ibid.: 273) 39
out of 52 children aged between 5½ and 7 agree that they
have been told enough when in fact the experimenter’s
instructions were underinformative. Similar ﬁndings are
reported in their second experiment, and in several other
studies where the question was phrased in terms of a bin-
ary choice (Robinson & Whittaker, 1985, experiments 3
and 4; Beal & Flavell, 1982; Flavell et al., 1981, who asked
children ‘‘Do you think the instructions told you in a good
way or in a not-so-good way how to [complete the task]’’).
Nevertheless, Beck et al. (2008), Nadig and Sedivy
(2002), Nilsen and Graham (2009) and others present evi-
dence that children may be sensitive to the ambiguity in
the referential communication task, albeit in more indirect
ways. Such evidence has also been available early on in this
line of work, as Patterson, Cosgrove, and O’Brien (1980)
report that children showed longer reaction times for
ambiguous than non-ambiguous messages, and made
more eye-contact with the speaker. Plumert (1996) reports
that children were delayed in starting to search for an ob-
ject when the instructions did not disambiguate the hiding
place; and Flavell et al. (1981) report that asking children
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pauses and puzzled expressions. Moreover, Jackson and Ja-
cobs (1982) and Brédart (1984), who used the sentence-to-
picture matching paradigm, report that children are very
good at selecting the referent for which the instructions
would be informative, rather than the referent who was
compatible with the instructions but for which the instruc-
tions would have been underinformative.
These ﬁndings tentatively suggest that children can de-
tect ambiguity, but for some reason resist correcting their
experimenter. Stronger evidence to this effect can be ad-
duced from Robinson and Whittaker (1985; experiments
3 and 4) who gave 6-year-old children ambiguous or
unambiguous instructions for identifying one of three
PlayPeople. After the instructions children were asked
two things: ﬁrst, if they really knew which PlayPerson
to select, children were told to point to him/her. But if
they did not really know which PlayPerson to select, the
children were told to point to a ‘mystery man’. Second,
children had to tell the experimenter if s/he had given
them enough information to ﬁnd the PlayPerson or not.
Children pointed to the ‘mystery man’ at rates of 68%,
showing that in the majority of trials they were aware
that they did not know enough to select a PlayPerson.
Nevertheless, subsequently they accepted that the exper-
imenter had said enough at rates of 80%.
These ﬁndings are straightforwardly in line with our
proposal about pragmatic tolerance. Children may choose
not to correct their interlocutor when asked to evaluate
the instructions in a binary decision task, despite being
aware that the instructions are not optimal. Therefore, it
is likely that children’s sensitivity to ambiguity in the ref-
erential communication task has been underestimated
due to pragmatic tolerance4.
Additionally, research by Davies and Katsos (2010) using
the referential communication paradigm can shed some
light on factors affecting the extent of pragmatic tolerance.
Motivated by earlier versions of the present work (Katsos &
Smith, 2010), Davies and Katsos (2010) tested English-
speaking 5- to 6-year-olds and adults with both under-
and over-informative instructions. In a binary judgment
task, over-informative instructions were accepted at equal
rates as the optimal ones by the children, suggesting lack
of sensitivity to over-informativeness. The adults on the
other hand rejected over-informative instructions signiﬁ-
cantly more than optimal instructions, giving rise to a sim-
ilar child–adult discrepancy as in our experiment 1 for
underinformativeness. However, when participants were
given a magnitude estimation scale, both children and
adults rated the over-informative instructions signiﬁcantly
lower than the optimal ones. Thus, Davies and Katsos
(2010) conclude that pragmatic tolerance applies to over-
informativeness as well. Both children and adults rejected
underinformative utterances signiﬁcantly more often than
over-informative utterances in the binary judgement task,
suggesting that they are less tolerant of underinformative-4 Having suggested this, we should also acknowledge that our proposal is
orthogonal to other key questions in that literature, such as why children
do not refrain from selecting a referent even when they have insufﬁcient
information for doing so.ness than over-informativeness. This makes sense in the
referential communication paradigm, as the under-
informativeness of the instructions (e.g. ‘pass me the star’
in a display with two stars) precludes participants from
establishing the referent of the noun phrase. Hence, these
ﬁndings suggest that pragmatic tolerance is further modu-
lated by whether fundamental components of the speech
act are jeopardized, such as establishing reference and sat-
isfying presuppositions.
Finally, we consider whether children are more tolerant
than adults, and if so, why. In experiment 1, children pre-
dominantly accepted thecritical utterances,while theadults
always objected to them, albeit typically in a more indirect
and meta-linguistic way than when rejecting semantically
false utterances (around 25% of responses were revisions,
hedges, and meta-linguistic remarks). We explore three
hypotheses for why children differ from adults.
The simplest explanation is that the difference lies in
how children and adults verbalise their judgements. Chil-
dren may not be as competent as adults in expressing com-
plex judgments such as a ‘yes, but. . .’ or ‘half right, half
wrong’ as opposed to simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In this case,
young children may default to a simple ‘yes’, and we would
expect that the rates of indirect objections will rise along
with verbal ability.
Another explanation concerns personality traits that
develop over time. On our account, the defeasibility of
pragmatic meaning interacts with a decision that must
be made at a meta-linguistic level: whether to reject the
utterance as worse than optimal, or accept it as better than
false. We would expect personality factors such as cogni-
tive ﬂexibility or pedantry to contribute towards the group
difference between children and adults, as well as individ-
ual differences between participants. Recent research sug-
gests that the prevalence of autistic traits (Nieuwland,
Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010) and participants’ attitudes to
honesty and integrity (Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert,
2009) may affect their response to potentially underinfor-
mative stimuli.
A related but distinct explanation concerns children’s
certainty about their command of language overall. This
could be founded on an experience-based account. Chil-
dren have less exposure to language than adults, and this
limited experience may result in them being less certain
about their meta-linguistic judgments, and thus accept-
ing underinformative utterances (while having sufﬁcient
experience with truth and falsity to reject semantically
false utterances). Indeed, research in the referential com-
munication paradigm and on children’s certainty about
their interpretation of ambiguous messages (Robinson
& Whittaker, 1985) could inform these hypotheses. These
accounts should be empirically testable in future work.
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Non-scalar expressions
1. The monkey loves eating yummy stuff.





2. The dancer likes packing beautiful
clothes in her suitcase. There’s a skirt, a




3. The spaceman wants to buy stuff for his
new spaceship. There’s a computer, a





4. The dog is an artist. He likes painting
things. There’s a square, a star, a triangle
and a heart
The dog painted
the heart and the
triangle
5. The ﬂamingo likes giving presents to his
friend, the owl. There’s a pen, a ball, a
car, and an umbrella
The ﬂamingo
gave the owl the
ball and the pen
6. The boy likes watering the plants in the
garden. There’s a tree, a ﬂower, some




7. The squirrel is hungry and wants to eat
something tasty. There’s a pizza, a
hamburger, a lollipop and an ice-cream
The squirrel ate
the pizza
8. The doctor likes washing his toys. Here’s




9. Mr. Tough likes pushing things. There’s a
box, a car, a desk and a TV
Mr. Tough
pushed the TV
10. The builder likes carrying things
around. There’s a piano, a parcel, a





11. The spaceman wants to play with his
toys. There is a puppet, a ball, a truck
and a set of pencils
The spaceman
played with the
truck and the bal
12. The dog wants to eat some fruit.
There’s an apple, a pear, an orange and a
banana
The dog ate the
banana and the
appleAppendix A
List of stories and utterances for experiments 1, 2 and 3.
The ﬁrst column describes the starting point of each story,
and the second column describes the outcome. The third
column presents the question that the experimenter asked.
Column four presents the response given by Mr. Caveman.
Items 1–12 are the non-scalar expressions, while items
13–24 the scalar ones. The ﬁfth column presents the felic-










































































So, what did the
dog eat?






13. The elephant likes pushing things.










14. The giraffe is hungry for fruit. There are
apples and pears on the trees
The giraffe ate all
the pears






15. Mr. Tough likes lifting stuff up. There
are boxes and stones
Mr. Tough lifted
all the boxes






16. The crocodile wants to play with toys.












17. The lady likes shooting arrows at
things. There are doors and windows
The lady hit all
the doors






18. The mouse wants to pick up vegetables.
There are pumpkins and carrots
The mouse
picked up all the
carrots






19. The goat likes jumping over things.
There are fences and bushes
The goat jumped
over three out of
ﬁve fences







20. The dancer likes picking ﬂowers. There
are red ﬂowers and yellow ﬂowers
The dancer
picked up three
out of ﬁve red
ﬂowers







21. The turtle likes playing with his toys.
There are balls and trucks
The turtle played
with three out of
ﬁve balls








22. The boy likes lifting things up. There
are books and shoes
The boy lifted
ﬁve out of ﬁve
books





23. The ﬂamingo likes painting things.










24. The postman likes giving yummy stuff
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Sample displays of the starting point and outcome of
the scenarios for a scalar (Pictures 1 and 2) and a non-
scalar expression (Pictures 3 and 4) in the underinforma-
tive condition in experiments 1 and 3.Picture 1. Starting point for scalar.Appendix C
Sample displays of the outcome phase of experiment 3
for a scalar and non-scalar expression. The initial state is
identical to that of experiment 1 (see Pictures 5 and 6).
Picture 2. Outcome for scalar.
Picture 3. Starting point for non-scalar.
Picture 5. Outcome for scalar.
Picture 6. Outcome for non-scalar.
Picture 4. Outcome for non-scalar.
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